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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW[l
WARRANTY AND DECEIT-REMEDY FOR
MISREPRESENTATION IN CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
I. SCOPE OF ARTICLE
The tort action of deceit and the contract or, more properly, quasi-
tort' action for breach of warranty are closely allied. It is the purpose
of this article to show the similarities between the two insofar as they
provide a remedy for misrepresentations made during the course of
contractual negotiations. In the area of deceit, therefore, this article
will consider only those cases in which this type of misrepresentation
is involved. The relation between strict liability for facts misrepre-
sented in an action for breach of warranty and a tendency toward
strict liability for facts misrepresented in the course of contractual
negotiations in a deceit will be shown. Finally a defense of the special
treatment of this type of deceit cases will be made.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The action for damages resulting from misrepresentation was a
quite limited one under the early common law. In 1603 the oft-quoted
case of Chandler v. Lopus,2 in which defendant sold a product falsely
stating it to be a bezoar stone, stated: "The bare affirmation that it
was a bezoar stone, without warranting it to be so, is no cause; and
although he knew it to be no bezoar stone, it is not material. . .- 3 At
this time there was no recovery for a misrepresentation made during
the course of contractual negotiations unless the fact was specifically
warranted by the vendor using the words warrant or warranty. At this
stage in the development of the law, the action for breach of warranty
was a tort action. The first reported case where an action for breach
of warranty was brought in assumpsit did not occur until 1778. 4 The
tort action however, prior to this time, evolved significant modifica-
tions to the Chandler v. Lopus rule. In 1689 Lord Holt decided that
one who made a mere affirmation as to ownership, which was untrue,
would be liable and scienter, or knowledge of the falsity, was not a
necessary allegation. 5 Eleven years later, in a case where the defense
was the seller's good faith in making an affirmation of title, Lord Holt
stated: "the plea [good faith] is ill and the action well lies. Where a
man is in possession of a thing which is a colour of title an action will
lie upon a bare affirmation that the goods sold are his own."'
Hence, besides the specific warranty recognized by Chandler v.
Lopus, it now became sufficient to charge the vendor on a mere affir-
I WILLISTON, SALES §197 (rev. ed. 1948), see p. 41.
2 Cro. Jac. 4.
3 Ibid.
- Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Dougl. 18 (1689).
5Cross v. Garnet, 3 Mod. 261; also under name Crosse v. Gardner, 1 Show.
*68, Carthew 90 (1700).
6 Medina v. Stoughton, I Ld. Raym. 593, 1 Salk. 210 (1778).
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mation if it was an affirmation of ownership. Mere affirmations of
fact other than title (i. e., warranties of quality, had not yet been held
to be sufficient, nor had the action been extended to include misrepre-
sentations other than those relating to the product itself. It is at this
stage in their development that the causes of action became separate.
After a dearth of cases during most of the eighteenth century, the
first reported case where action on a warranty was brought in assump-
sit occurred in 1778.7 Eleven years later Pasley v. Freemans recog-
nized the validity of a tort action of deceit in which no warranty situ-
ation was involvedY From this point on the two concepts developed
separately, and different principals were applied to each. Their com-
mon origin must, however, be kept in mind.
III. WARRANTY-STRICT LIABILITY
As was noted above, the courts never required scienter or know-
ledge of the falsity of the representation as an element in a breach of
warranty action. They did require an intent to warrant. This require-
ment, however, was not acceptable to most of the American jurisdic-
tions and such a requirement was specifically negated by the Uniform
Sales Act'0 which has been enacted in 36 states." It is made even
more explicit in the Uniform Commercial Code.2The abolition of this
requirement coupled with the fact that knowledge of the falsity had
never been required resulted in imposing strict liability upon a vendor
for material affirmations of fact relating to the product sold.
Wisconsin had maintained the position taken by the Uniform Sales
Act even before the enactment of the statute in 1911.13 After its
adoption the court merely continued to apply it in the same way as it
had the prior law."
IV. DECEIT-KNOWLEDGE AS AN ELEMENT OF LIABILITY
For about a century after the decision of Pasley v. Freeman 5 there
7 Cited at note 5, supra.
8 Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term Rep. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (1789).
9 In fact this decision was more concerned with plaintiff's right to recover
from defendant because of the absence of any contractual relation between
the parties. It recognized such right.
10 Uniform Sales Act, §12; Wis. Stats. §121.12 (1957). "Any affirmation of fact
or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if
the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to
purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon."
"1 Uniform State Laws Handbook, p. 287 (1958).
12 Uniform Commercial Code, §2-313 (1957 official text). "(2) It is not neces-
sary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words
such as 'warrant' or 'guarantee' or that he have a specific intention to make
a warranty..."
13 Smith v. Justice, 13 Wis. *600 (1861) ; Hahn v. Doolittle, 18 Wis. *196 (1864);
Neave v. Arntz, 56 Wis. 174, 14 N.W. 41 (1882); White v. Stelloh, 74 Wis.
435, 43 N.W. 99 (1889) ; Barnes v. Burns, 81 Wis. 232, 51 N.W. 419 (1892);
Hoffman v. Divon, 105 Wis. 315, 81 N.W. 491 (1900)
'4 Kimball Clark Co. v. Crosby, 175 Wis. 337, 185 N.W. 172 (1921); Valley
Refrigeration Co. v. Lange Co., 242 Wis. 466, 8 N.W. 2d 294 (1943).
15 Cited at note 8,supra.
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was no definitive announcement of the exact definition of the require-
ment of knowledge as an element of deceit liability. Such an announce-
ment finally came in 1889 when the House of Lords handed down
their decision in the landmark case of Derry v. Peek.16 In this case
the defendants were directors of a company whose shares plaintiff had
been induced to purchase through false statements contained in the
company's prospectus which defendants had prepared. The trial court
found that the defendants did not know of the falsity of the state-
ments and denied relief to plaintiff. On appeal the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and held that the honesty of defendants' be-
liefs was no defense since there were no reasonable grounds for such
beliefs. The House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeals and af-
firmed the trial court, Lord Herschell ruling that: "First, in order to
sustain an action of deceit there must be proof of fraud, and noth-
ing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is
shown that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or
(2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it
be true or false."' 17 In effect this ruling held that there could be lia-
bility only if the defendant knew the statement was false or did not
believe it was true or did not care whether it was true or false. The
case made this statement as a general rule and did not differentiate
between cases involving parties having a contractual relation and other
cases.
Many American jurisdictions had by this time (1889) already
developed their own rules on this subject. Especially in cases where
the misrepresentation occurred in the course of contractual negotiations,
some courts, influenced by the law relating to warranties, had devel-
oped a strict liability theory obviating the necessity of proving either
intent to deceive or knowledge of the falsity of the misrepresentation. 18
Many jurisdictions profess to follow the Derry v. Peek rule.' 9 How-
ever many of these have engrafted minor modifications. Another
group holds liable a defendant who is doubtful whether his statement
is true or false. Such a situation comes under the Derry v. Peek rule,
since there can be no honest belief in the truth of one's statement if
one is doubtful whether it is true or false.20 Still other jurisdictions
hold that regardless of whether defendant honestly believes his state-
ment is true, he will be liable if he affirms it to be true of his own
knowledge when, in fact, his belief rests on some other basis. These
cases also hold that the affirmance be the defendant of the fact as a
fact, without disclosing the source of his information, presupposes that
16 Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 333 (1889).
17 Ibid.
is 23 A, i. JuR., Fraud and Deceit, §120 (1939).
19 Id., §115.
20 Harper and James, TORTS, §7.3 at 534 (1956).
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the truth of that fact has been ascertained by his own knowledge.2 1
This rule is an obvious departure from Derry v. Peek since under it a
defendant may honestly and even reasonably believe his statement is
true but if it is a belief founded on some source other than his own
knowledge, which source he does not reveal, and the representation
turns out to be false, he will be liable.22 Such a rule closely approaches
the same reasoning which underlies liability for breach of warranty.
23
Unfortunately, in applying the above rules, most courts do not ex-
plicitly differentiate between actions where there is a contractual rela-
tionship between the parties and cases where such a relationship does
not exist. Particularly is this true in Wisconsin where the court's
statements in deceit cases seem, at first glance, irreconcilable. A closer
examination of the cases, however, shows that the court does in fact
apply one rule in controversies between contracting parties and a dif-
ferent rule in cases where there is no contractual relationship.
In an early Wisconsin case it was held that defendant was not
liable if he believed the representation to be true at the time he made it,
but the court explicitly pointed out that there was no contractual rela-
tion between the parties.2 4 However in the first deceit action which
involved contracting parties the court stated: ". . . where a vendor
undertakes to point out to the purchaser the boundaries of his land, he
is under obligation to point them out correctly, and has no right to
make a mistake, except under the penalty of responding in damages.) 25
This case was followed in the two subsequent cases in which the par-
ties had a contractual relationship.2 6
In Barndt v. Frederick27 the court made a statement which is
capable of more than one interpretation. "In the action to recover
damages for the alleged fraud and deceit, the plaintiff must ... aver
and prove that the defendant knew they [representations] were false
and had no good reason to believe they were true ... .,"2s If by "no good
reason" the court means that they were based on a source other than
defendant's own knowledge, then this case is in accord with the subse-
quent cases on the subject. Such a view of the Wisconsin cases was
expressed in the next case decided by the court where it held: "If the
statements are in fact untrue, it is legal fraud, although not then
known to be untrue, for the falsehood consists in stating that the party
2123 Ai. Jup-, Fraud and Deceit, §119 (1939).
22 Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REv. 415 (1910).
23 Harper and James, op. cit. supra at 535.
24Lakin v. Tibbets, 1 Wis. *500 (1853); see also Smith v. Mlariner, 5 Wis.
*551 (1856).
25 Bird v. Kleiner, 41 Wis. 134 (1876).
26 Cotzhausen v. Simon, 47 Wis. 103, 1 N.W. 473 (1879); Davis v. Nuzun, 72




knew the facts when he did not. ,, " Hence Wisconsin holds that the
affirmation of the fact presupposes that defendant knows the statement
is true and he is liable if the statement is false. Even though he may
believe it is true, it is no defense.
The following three cases, likewise, held that scienter was not
necessary.30 In Benolkin v. Guthrie31 the court again enunciated the
Wisconsin rule as follows: ". . . false representations of material facts
... if made knowingly or without knowing whether they are true or
false . . .are actionable. . . ." (emphasis added). 32 Hence defendant's
belief in these cases is immaterial. If he does not actually know, of
his own knowledge, that his statement is true he will be liable. After
three more cases which followed this rule,33 the court, in First National
Bank v. Hackett,3 4 clarified the basis for the rule when it stated: "It
was not necessary that Mr. Hackett should vouch for the truthfulness
of the statement made. It was sufficient that he made a positive state-
ment of the facts and did not state it as being made upon informa-
tion." 35 The similarity between this reasoning and the reasoning in
warranty law which differentiates between affirmation and opinion is
evident.
In 1919 the court quoted and approved the Derry v. Peek"0 rule.
In the case before the court, however, it found that defendant's state-
ments as to the value of stock which plaintiff was induced to buy were
made recklessly, careless whether they were true or false. 7 Thus the
question of the reasonableness of defendant's beliefs as a defense was
not considered and hence the decision is not in conflict with the pre-
vious cases. In a subsequent case, however, the court explicitly reaf-
firmed its reasoning on the subject. In Lee v. Bielefeld, 8 the lower
court found that because defendant's statements were not recklessly
made there could be no recovery. This holding was reversed on appeal,
the court holding that regardless of defendant's good faith, if 'he makes
a positive statement of fact, he will be liable for damages resulting to
plaintiff if the statement turns out to be actually untrue.
In the case which followed the court stated that intent to defraud
must be established. In the instant case, however, the court found
29 The Montreal River Lumber Co. v. Mihills, 80 Wis. 540, 50 N.W. 507 (1891).
30 Gunther v. Ullrich, 82 Wis. 222, 52 N.W. 88 (1892); Beetle v. Anderson,
98 Wis. 5, 73 N.W. 560 (1897); Krause v. Busacker, 105 Wis. 350, 81 N.W.
406 (1900).
31 Benolkin v. Guthrie, 111 Wis. 554, 87 N.W. 466 (1901).
32 Ibid.
33Matteson v. Rice, 116 Wis. 328, 92 N.W. 1109 (1903); Palmer v. Goldberg,
128 Wis. 103, 107 N.W. 478 (1906); Helberg v. Hosmer, 143 Wis. 620, 128
N.W. 439 (1910).
34 First National Bank v. Hackett, 159 Wis. 113, 149 N.W. 703 (1914).
5 Ibid.
36 Cited at note 16, supra.
37 Bechman v. Salzer, 168 Wis. 277, 169 N.W. 279 (1919).
3 Lee v. Bielefeld, 176 Wis. 225, 186 N.W. 587 (1922).
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that there was such an intent and the question of defendant's know-
ledge or belief was not discussed and thus there was no true departure
from the established rule.3 9 In the next case in which the question was
discussed the court held that the honesty of defendant's belief was no
defense, if the statement was of an existing fact of which the defend-
ant had no actual knowledge.40 In Graff v. Tinkham41 the court once
again distinguished between positive statements of fact and state-
ments made only upon information. "If the defendant disclosed the
source of his information and had no knowledge of the falsity of such
information, or, not knowing it to be true, did not fraudulently or
recklessly make the representation that it was true, or if both parties
were equally informed, then the defendant would not be liable."4'
The most recent Wisconsin decisions, by way of dicta, seem to
show dissatisfaction with the Wisconsin rule.4 3 None of these cases
were decided on this particular point, however, and hence the estab-
lished Wisconsin rule is still intact. In order to apply a different test,
the Wisconsin court would have to overrule a long and continued line
of precedent. In the discussion which follows, a defense of the estab-
lished rule will be made and an argument presented, not only for its
retention, but also for its clarification.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
As can be seen from the definition of warranty, 44 its scope is limited
to affirmations of fact or promises relating to the goods sold. Other
affirmations, regardless of their importance as an inducing factor in
making the contract, must be treated under deceit law. The similarity
of such different affirmations, insofar as they (1) induce the contract,
(2) result in a detriment to one party, and (3) confer a benefit on the
other party may best be illustrated by a comparison of deceit cases
with warranty cases. In Bird v. Kleiner45 defendant pointed out land
belonging to another and told plaintiff it was his own land. In reliance
thereon plaintiff took a deed of defendant's land and brought an action
39 International Milling Co. v. Priem, 179 Wis. 622, 192 N.W. 68 (1923).
40 De Swarte v. First National Bank of Wauwatosa, 188 Wis. 455, 206 N.WAr.
887 (1925).41 Graff v. Tinkham, 202 Wis. 141, 231 N.W. 593 (1930).
42 Ibid.
43 Tews v. Marg, 246 Wis. 245, 16 N.W. 2d 795 (1944), "To support an action
for fraud and deceit, knowledge of the falsity of the statement... or proof
that the statement was made recklessly without regard to accuracy, must be
shown." (The case decided that the real issues had not been tried and it was
sent back to the lower court for a new trial.) ; Benz v. Zobel, 255 Wis. 542,
39 N.W. 2d 713 (1949), "No proof was offered in the case nor were there
any findings by the jury or by the court to the effect that the statements were
known by the appellant to be false or that they were made with intent to
deceive or defraud." (The case was decided on the issue of reliance by
plaintiff on the representations.).
44 See note 10, supra.
S5Cited at note 25, supra.
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in deceit. In Hoffman v. Dixon6 defendant told plaintiff that certain
seed was rape seed when it was actually mustard seed. In reliance
thereon plaintiff bought the seed and brought an action for breach of
warranty. In both cases plaintiffs bought property relying on false
statements as to what they were actually buying. Both plaintiffs suf-
fered a loss because the representation was false and both defendants
were benefited. By applying the Wisconsin deceit rule plaintiff was
able to recover in the Bird case regardless of the honesty of defend-
ant's belief and it was not necessary to establish that the misrepre-
sentation was recklessly or carelessly made, just as defendant's good
faith in the breach of warranty case was no defense.
In The Montreal River Lumber Co. v. Mihills 7 plaintiff brought a
deceit action to recover damages resulting from a misrepresentation by
defendant as to the amount of lumber sold. In Kimball Clark Co. v.
Crosby4S plaintiff brought a breach of warranty action to recover
damages resulting from a misrepresentation by defendant as to the
amount of machinery belting sold. By applying the Wisconsin rule in
the deceit case defendant's good faith was no defense since he stated
that he ".... knew the facts when he did not. . . ." Any other result,
considering the similarity in fact situations between these two cases,
would be difficult to justify.
The comparisons above, of course, involve misrepresentations
relating to the property sold. But even when the misrepresentation is
of a different type, the similarity between the two actions is evident.
In Neave v. ArntA9 defendant represented that a reaper he sold to
plaintiff would perform satisfactorily. It did not so perform and under
warranty law plaintiff recovered without the necessity of showing that
defendant knew that his representation was false. In Benz v. Zobel
50
plaintiff alleged that he was induced to enter into a share-cropping
contract in reliance upon defendant's representation that the machinery
on the farm in question was in good working condition, when in fact
it was not. The court held that there was no reliance by plaintiff on
the representation and hence based its decision on this ground. How-
ever, it stated, by way of dicta, that: "No proof was offered in the case
nor were there any findings made by the jury or by the court to the
effect that the statements mentioned were known by the appellant to
be false. . . ."51 Under such a rule as this plaintiff would have to show,
not merely that defendant made the statements as affirmations of fact
when in fact he did not know them to be true of his own knowledge,
46 Cited at note 13, supra.
4 Cited at note 29, supra.
48 Cited at note 14, supra.
49 Cited at note 13, supra.
50 Cited at note 43, supra.
51 Ibid., at 566.
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but would have to prove that he knew them to be actually false. What
justification can there be for such a rule? In the Neave 2 case plaintiff
bought machinery relying on the defendant's representations as to its
quality. In the Benz53 case plaintiff alleged that he entered into the
share-cropping contract relying on the representation as to the ma-
chinery's quality. In both cases there would have been no contract had
the true facts been known. In both cases the plaintiffs suffered loss
and the defendants were benefited as a result of the misrepresenta-
tion. To require plaintiff to prove actual knowledge by defendant of
the falsity of his representation in the deceit case would be a backward
step in the law relating to misrepresentations made in the course of
contractual negotiations.
From the discussion of Wisconsin deceit cases above, it can be seen
that the court has wavered from time to time in its statement of the
rule. Some of the language is capable of varying interpretations and
some of the dicta, especially recently, certainly casts doubt upon the
stability of the rule. It is submitted that the Wisconsin rule is a proper
one when applied to contractual misrepresentations, and by comparing
the deceit cases with warranty cases the underlying logic of the rule
becomes evident. Rather than change this rule it is hoped that it will
be, not only retained, but also revitalized by a thorough review of the
precedent cases in this field and a clarification and clear-cut exposition
of the rule.
R. CHARLES WATHEN
52 Cited at note 13, supra.
5 Cited at note 43, supra.
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